Back in 1941, Franklin D. Roosevelt was President, and World War II was going on. The Democrat President’s socialist New Deal has been in force since the Great Depression of the 1930s, and war production was gradually lifting the economy out of the Depression. War restrictions on the economy were taking effect, and the New Deal regulations were essentially giving the federal government near-complete control of all economic activity in America. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 put strict regulations on all food-growing activities of all US farmers, wherever and whatever they grew. There was such a thing as “excess production” which was prohibited by Regulation. The case of Wickard vs Filburn was before the Supreme Court, and it had an earth-shaking effect that echoes down the decades even today.

The following explication of this case is taken from the Justia Web site.

U.S. Supreme Court

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)Wickard v. FilburnNo. 59Argued May 4, 1942Reargued October 13, 1942Decided November 9, 1942317 U.S. 111APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATESFOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIOSyllabus 1. Pending a referendum vote of farmers upon wheat quotas proclaimed by the Secretary of Agriculture under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the Secretary made a radio address in which he advocated approval of the quotas and called attention to the recent enactment by Congress of the amendatory act, later approved Page 317 U. S. 112 May 26, 1941. The speech mentioned the provisions of the amendment for increase of loans on wheat, but not the fact that it also increased the penalty on excess production, and added that, because of the uncertain world situation, extra acreages of wheat had been deliberately planted, and “farmers should not be penalized because they have provided insurance against shortages of food.” There was no evidence that the subsequent referendum vote approving the quotas was influenced by the speech. Held, that, in any event, and even assuming that the penalties referred to in the speech were those prescribed by the Act, the validity of the vote was not thereby affected. P. 317 U. S. 117. 2. The wheat marketing quota and attendant penalty provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by the Act of May 26, 1941, when applied to wheat not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm, are within the commerce power of Congress. P. 317 U. S. 118. 3. The effect of the Act is to restrict the amount of wheat which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing for his own needs. P. 317 U. S. 127. 4. That the production of wheat for consumption on the farm may be trivial in the particular case is not enough to remove the grower from the scope of federal regulation where his contribution, taken with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. P. 317 U. S. 127. 5. The power to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such prices. P. 317 U. S. 128. 6. A factor of such volume and variability as wheat grown for home consumption would have a substantial influence on price conditions on the wheat market, both because such wheat, with rising prices, may flow into the market and check price increases and, because, though never marketed, it supplies the need of the grower which would otherwise be satisfied by his purchases in the open market. P. 317 U. S. 128. 7. The amendatory Act of May 26, 1941, which increased the penalty upon “farm marketing excess” and included in that category wheat which previously had not been subject to penalty, held not invalid as retroactive legislation repugnant to the Fifth Amendment when applied to wheat planted and growing before it was enacted, but harvested and threshed thereafter. P. 317 U. S. 131. 43 F. Supp. 1017, reversed. Page 317 U. S. 113 APPEAL from a decree of the District Court of three judges which permanently enjoined the Secretary of Agriculture and other appellants from enforcing certain penalties against the appellee, a farmer, under the Agricultural Adjustment Act. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee filed his complaint against the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, three members of the County Agricultural Conservation Committee for Montgomery County, Ohio, and a member of the State Agricultural Conservation Committee for Ohio. He sought to enjoin enforcement against himself of the marketing penalty imposed by the amendment of May 26, 1941, [Footnote 1] to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, [Footnote 2] upon that part of his 1941 wheat crop which was available for marketing in excess of the marketing quota established for his farm. He also sought a declaratory judgment that the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act, as amended and applicable to him, were unconstitutional because not sustainable Page 317 U. S. 114 under the Commerce Clause or consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Secretary moved to dismiss the action against him for improper venue, but later waived his objection and filed an answer. The other appellants moved to dismiss on the ground that they had no power or authority to enforce the wheat marketing quota provisions of the Act, and, after their motion was denied, they answered, reserving exceptions to the ruling on their motion to dismiss. [Footnote 3] The case was submitted for decision on the pleadings and upon a stipulation of facts. The appellee for many years past has owned and operated a small farm in Montgomery County, Ohio, maintaining a herd of dairy cattle, selling milk, raising poultry, and selling poultry and eggs. It has been his practice to raise a small acreage of winter wheat, sown in the Fall and harvested in the following July; to sell a portion of the crop; to feed part to poultry and livestock on the farm, some of which is sold; to use some in making flour for home consumption, and to keep the rest for the following seeding. The intended disposition of the crop here involved has not been expressly stated. In July of 1940, pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as then amended, there were established for the appellee’s 1941 crop a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres and a normal yield of 20.1 bushels of wheat an acre. He was given notice of such allotment in July of 1940, before the Fall planting of his 1941 crop of wheat, and again in July of 1941, before it was harvested. He sowed, however, 23 acres, and harvested from his 11.9 acres of excess acreage 239 bushels, which, under the terms of the Act as amended on May 26, 1941, constituted farm Page 317 U. S. 115 marketing excess, subject to a penalty of 49 cents a bushel, or $117.11 in all. The appellee has not paid the penalty, and he has not postponed or avoided it by storing the excess under regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, or by delivering it up to the Secretary. The Committee, therefore, refused him a marketing card, which was, under the terms of Regulations promulgated by the Secretary, necessary to protect a buyer from liability to the penalty and upon its protecting lien. [Footnote 4] The general scheme of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as related to wheat is to control the volume moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses and shortages and the consequent abnormally low or high wheat prices and obstructions to commerce. [Footnote 5] Within prescribed limits and by prescribed standards, the Secretary of Agriculture is directed to ascertain and proclaim each year a national acreage allotment for the next crop of wheat, which is then apportioned to the states and their counties, and is eventually broken up into allotments for individual farms. [Footnote 6] Loans and payments to wheat farmers are authorized in stated circumstances. [Footnote 7] The Act further provides that, whenever it appears that the total supply of wheat as of the beginning of any marketing year, beginning July 1, will exceed a normal year’s domestic consumption and export by more than 35 percent, the Secretary shall so proclaim not later than May 15 prior to the beginning of such marketing year, and that, during the marketing year, a compulsory national marketing quota shall be in effect with respect to the marketing Page 317 U. S. 116 of wheat. [Footnote 8] Between the issuance of the proclamation and June 10, the Secretary must, however, conduct a referendum of farmers who will be subject to the quota, to determine whether they favor or oppose it; and, if more than one-third of the farmers voting in the referendum do oppose, the Secretary must, prior to the effective date of the quota, by proclamation suspend its operation. [Footnote 9] On May 19, 1941, the Secretary of Agriculture made a radio address to the wheat farmers of the United States in which he advocated approval of the quotas and called attention to the pendency of the amendment of May 26, 1941, which had at the time been sent by Congress to the White House, and pointed out its provision for an increase in the loans on wheat to 85 percent of parity. He made no mention of the fact that it also increased the penalty from 15 cents a bushel to one-half of the parity loan rate of about 98 cents, but stated that, “Because of the uncertain world situation, we deliberately planted several million extra acres of wheat. . . . Farmers should not be penalized because they have provided insurance against shortages of food.” Pursuant to the Act, the referendum of wheat growers was held on May 31, 1941. According to the required published statement of the Secretary of Agriculture, 81 percent of those voting favored the marketing quota, with 19 percent opposed. The court below held, with one judge dissenting, that the speech of the Secretary invalidated the referendum, and that the amendment of May 26, 1941, “insofar as it increased the penalty for the farm marketing excess over the fifteen cents per bushel prevailing at the time of planting and subjected the entire crop to a lien for the payment thereof,” should not be applied to the appellee because, Page 317 U. S. 117 as so applied, it was retroactive, and in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and, alternatively, because the equities of the case so required. 43 F. Supp. 1017. Its Judgment permanently enjoined appellants from collecting a marketing penalty of more than 15 cents a bushel on the farm marketing excess of appellee’s 1941 wheat crop, from subjecting appellee’s entire 1941 crop to a lien for the payment of the penalty, and from collecting a 15-cent penalty except in accordance with the provisions of § 339 of the Act as that section stood prior to the amendment of May 26, 1941. [Footnote 10] The Secretary and his codefendants have appealed. [Footnote 11] I The holding of the court below that the Secretary’s speech invalidated the referendum is manifest error. Read as a whole and in the context of world events that constituted his principal theme, the penalties of which he spoke were more likely those in the form of ruinously low prices resulting from the excess supply, rather than the penalties prescribed in the Act. But, under any interpretation, the speech cannot be given the effect of invalidating the referendum. There is no evidence that any voter put upon the Secretary’s words the interpretation that impressed the court below or was in any way misled. There is no showing that the speech influenced the outcome of the referendum. The record, in fact, does not show that any, and does not suggest a basis for even a guess as to how many, of the voting farmers dropped work to listen to “Wheat Farmers and the Battle for Page 317 U. S. 118 Democracy” at 11:30 in the morning of May 19th, which was a busy hour in one of the busiest of seasons. If this discourse intended reference to this legislation at all, it was, of course, a public Act, whose terms were readily available, and the speech did not purport to be an exposition of its provisions. To hold that a speech by a Cabinet officer, which failed to meet judicial ideals of clarity, precision, and exhaustiveness, may defeat a policy embodied in an Act of Congress would invest communication between administrators and the people with perils heretofore unsuspected. Moreover, we should have to conclude that such an officer is able to do by accident what he has no power to do by design. Appellee’s complaint, insofar as it is based on this speech, is frivolous, and the injunction, insofar as it rests on this ground, is unwarranted. United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative,307 U. S. 533. II It is urged that, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Article I, § 8, clause 3, Congress does not possess the power it has in this instance sought to exercise. The question would merit little consideration, since our decision in United States v. Darby,312 U. S. 100, [Footnote 12] sustaining the federal power to regulate production of goods for commerce, except for the fact that this Act extends federal regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce, but wholly for consumption on the farm. The Act includes a definition of “market” and its derivatives, so that, as related to wheat, in addition to its conventional meaning, it also means to dispose of “by feeding (in any Page 317 U. S. 119 form) to poultry or livestock which, or the products of which, are sold, bartered, or exchanged, or to be so disposed of. [Footnote 13]” Hence, marketing quotas not only embrace all that may be sold without penalty, but also what may be consumed on the premises. Wheat produced on excess acreage is designated as “available for marketing” as so defined, and the penalty is imposed thereon. [Footnote 14] Penalties do not depend upon whether any part of the wheat, either within or without the quota, is sold or intended to be sold. The sum of this is that the Federal Government fixes a quota including all that the farmer may harvest for sale or for his own farm needs, and declares that wheat produced on excess acreage may neither be disposed of nor used except upon payment of the penalty, or except it is stored as required by the Act or delivered to the Secretary of Agriculture. Appellee says that this is a regulation of production and consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond the reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they are local in character, and their effects upon interstate commerce are, at most, “indirect.” In answer, the Government argues that the statute regulates neither production nor consumption, but only marketing, and, in the alternative, that, if the Act does go beyond the regulation of marketing, it is sustainable as a “necessary and proper” [Footnote 15] implementation of the power of Congress over interstate commerce.

That is very dense. The short and sweet description is that the Supreme Court agreed with the Roosevelt administration that, even if a Farmer declares that the “excess” wheat he grows on his farm is solely for his family’s consumption on the farm and not for sale in any form of commerce, that “excess” wheat is considered to be “Interstate Commerce” and the Federal Government may prohibit him from growing ANY amount of wheat over the Government’s strict crop limits, regardless of the reason. The main effect of this ruling was and is that any kind of economic activity anywhere in America is liable to Federal Regulation, up to and including quotas, restrictions on sale or transfer, and seizure and/or destruction of said “excess production”. Below is a great quote from an X account on the meaning of the decision and its relation to today’s US government.

We need to go back to 1942 to undo the SCOTUS decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, which upheld the use of the U.S. Constitution’s “commerce clause” to exercise control over a farmer growing food for his own family’s consumption, because his own use could, in some esoteric way, affect commerce generally, and perhaps even effect commerce between states. This makes essentially everything “interstate commerce” and subject to federal government control. This has caused an explosion of federal regulations and state accountability has decreased.

SCOTUS has rendered some stinkers over the years (Korematsu, Dred Scott, Plessy), and Wickard v. Filburn ranks as one of them. This is the least discussed bad decision of the Supreme Court.

So the New Deal of Roosevelt continues to hobble the US economy, and makes our country less free. Farmers do their work of feeding America with a special weight around their necks-the Federal Government. Some VERY powerful interest groups have sprung up to make sure that regulations are abided by and farmers cannot use their land in any way they please. The New Deal started it, and nearly every Presidential Administration and Supreme Court has added to the heavy burden of regulation by unelected bureaucrats on all Americans.